@vvs, we're still awaiting a response.

Kabisa!
In 2011-12 I was all gung-ho about KK. Segman whispered sweet nothings to us. He even shouted on top the rooftops. Press releases every month. I bought into it. Puma showed up and we (VVS included) went crazy. @VVS was in love.

Then came out the truth. Segman had entered into forwards at 100+ and the KES went from 82 to 107 to 84. And those forwards had to be paid.
When oil prices were rising, Segman bought hedges on oil too! Oil prices rose to $140 then fell to $90-ish. KK was effectively buying oil at $110+ when spot prices were much lower. A loss of 6bn. Almost wiped out the Revenue Reserves. Segman had jilted @VVS.

Exit Segman. Enter Ohana.

Ohana started selling properties (nice capital gains when revalued) among other assets. Employees (excess, thieves, lazy) were fired. Capex (stations looked old, etc) was reduced to save cash. Inventories (no more speculation) were trimmed down. OTS participation was reduced. No more fighting for unprofitable market share. Credit terms to customers and dealers were reduced. Dealers that didn't pay were cut off leading to dry-outs. Some dealers were kicked out. Some customers were cut off. Market share dropped. Debt was reduced. Dividends were eliminated.

Ohana stabilized KK through the above actions. Tough renegotiations to restructure loans with the banks. The hedges were 'burnt off' [expired & paid off] and a board decision was made NOT to enter into new hedges. KK borrowed KES to pay down USD debt not related to working capital. All subsidiaries were told that HQ will not bail them out. Subsidiaries were told to borrow locally and pay off USD debt. Some were told to pay back HQ.

KES debt was reduced in line with the reduction in inventories. Lucky for Ohana, lower oil prices ($40-60) meant USD 1mn could buy 2x the petrol vs 2011-12.

2014: The turnaround was happening. A profit was declared. A small token dividend was paid.

2015: Debt is significantly lower. 1H 2015 results were very good. And 2H is expected to be better. Subsidiaries have started Capex spend. Rwanda has added stations. KK is planning to build an office complex in 2016-18 which will provide rental income. Castrol-BP agreement means KK will expand its production and distribution of Castrol products.

Outstanding Issues: GoK has acknowledged but not settled the Yield Shift losses on behalf on KPRL. It's about if not when. That's cash waiting to be collected. Not in 2015 but in future years.
KPC has been told they owe money to KK. Not a question of if but how much. One day the court cases will come to a logical conclusion. That's extra cash whenever it comes.

And KK has turned from a brash teenager to a more mature firm. Shareholders (@VVS et al) will be more careful this time around. We will question management more aggressively.

2011: KK 16/- KQ: 38/- [I think]
2012: KK 15/- KQ 14/- [Rights]
2015: KK 8.50 KQ: 4/-

KK's NAV is around 7 today without accounting for revaluation gains + KPRL + KPC.
KQ's NAV is negative 22-ish. I doubt there's anything left to revalue!

Should I have sold KK at 16 in 2012? YES.
Did I sell KK at 16 in 2012? NO.
Did I buy KK at 10? YES
did I buy Kk at 9? YES
Did I buy Kk at 8? YES
Did I buy KK at 7+? YES

Did I sell KQ at 14-ish in 2012? YES. [Proceeds went into KenRe & KK]

Looking Forward:
I see KK adding KES 1-2 in PAT EPS annually. That's 12% per year. IFBs offer 13%.
I do not really care about KQ but for my taxes being used to bail it out. It needs to make (or raise) 33bn to get it to positive NAV. Dream on.

@VVS I am inspired by your analysis. This is what I need to make a valid decision! Thumbs up!