I missed your comment. You can read more from Alan Greenspan himself on why they had to de-regulate banking laws to avail credit to all income groups

@tomboy raises valid but unrealistic points in Kenya's circumstances.. He must have lived abroad. Fact is that the economy started falling sick under 24 years plus of economic misrule, Mwai Kibaki took us out of the ICU and we were almost discharged, but then 2007 happened, we thus remained in the ward, but in the last four years we have ended up in the HDU.. Corruption and bad policy will ensure that very few citizens in Kenya will ever get to drive a brand new car.

Also note that land across the world is classified as an appreciating asset.. Indeed better use of the same should be encouraged but comparing land to maize simply leaves me speechless

@tomboy the speculative land is normally less than half an acre, barely sufficient for subsistence farming.. Mambo ya starvation tuulize Kulalu

Valid points Tom_boy. Let's hope this rate cap will streamline land sector. I hear most banks are no longer financing land buying

You missed more than just the comment, fren.
About Greenspan, how did that turn out?
I will help you out. Greenspan's actions at the Fed directly (or indirectly, depending on who you ask) led to the subprime and CDO greed frenzy which brought about the 2008 financial meltdown. Economics is more than paper theory. Greenspan's policies looked good on paper, but failed in catastrophic fashion when banks, the same institutions you would much like to us to trust to self regulate, were given free reign.
What a terrible example you have chosen to prove your point.

Since the population increased by 3.3% a year,
real per capita income is estimated to have fallen by 5.5% in 1974 in constant prices. This is the first
time since independence that a decline in per capita income had been recorded. It is difficult to map
out specific policies for each of the markets but the general trend was that major controls were
introduced in this period. The controls introduced in this period included: (a) selective controls on
bank lending; (b) licensing of foreign exchange transactions; (c) quota restrictions on most imports;
(d) direct price controls on goods; and (e) control on interest rates.

These controls transcended all markets and acted as an easier response in controlling balance of
payments and inflationary pressures as far as the policy makers were concerned. But these
administrative controls produced major distortions and the discretionary powers gave room to
pervasive rent-seeking activities in the public sector that has been difficult to reverse and has formed a
basis of painful adjustment process in the 1990s. In a sense, these controls prevented the development
of markets; they constrained resource movements and efficient allocations and thus growth.

Researchers and most policy makers regard the 1980s as a lost decade for growth. This is because the
easy reaction to the crises in the early 1970s prevented the policy makers from formulating and
adopting stabilization and adjustment measures and policies in the financial sector, money market and
foreign exchange transactions that could reorient the economy in the phase of severe internal and
external shocks.