This has to be the most recycled bill.I've lost count of the number of times it has been introduced.

Another thing these fellows can do is strengthen institutions that fight corruption. Give the anti corruption powers to arrest, prosecute etc. Have special anti corruption courts manned by seriously vetted judges and for good measure thrown in a couple of foreign judges. But when Mutahi Ngunyi talks about a fellowship of thugs, he knows what he is saying! One more thing, why wouldn't Uhuru bring in Githongo if he is serious about fighting corruption? Lumumba can also assist in the fight!

Greed and lack of repercussions!!!

Even your house girl can embezzle the money she is given to buy groceries etc. and probably sell some of your stuff but she knows she will never get away with it so she refrains.

Just like we do with common thieves and muggers, when you catch a guy, put him in prison and discuss the "incentives" later. Why do we afford the "bigger" thieves luxuries we don't afford the small ones!

When the inequalities in rewards between doing good and doing bad are small, most people will choose the good.  In a world of equal wages, there would be no incentive for evil.  The more inequality there is, the larger the incentives for greedy behavior become.

@Ash Ock - In Kenya, we pay the corrupt buggers more than enough to live comfortably but that does not lower their incentive to steal.

Mega corruption in Kenya is not perpetrated by the poor. Far from it!!! It is not about paying people enough for them to survive. It is dealing with the corrupt ones ruthlessly.

Tomorrow open a newspaper and read any random story on mega corruption and see how many poor people are involved!!!

Rent-seeking never encourages productivity. The production of valuable goods and services is maximized with strong property rights when little is wasted in efforts to seize the surplus of others or to prevent others from seizing our surplus.

During a strong economy there are fewer incentives for rent-seeking because production is highly rewarded. But when economic times make it more difficult to produce, it becomes more attractive to rent-seek someone else’s surplus.

This situation can create a downward spiral because the rewards of rent-seeking are often constant, whereas the surpluses available in a market economy are more variable. When the economy is poor, the burden of fixed rent-seeking costs on producers drives surpluses even lower. This makes rent-seeking relatively more attractive, which in turn further burdens those who try to remain productive.