obiero wrote:newfarer wrote:obiero wrote:Aguytrying wrote:The optimist wrote:newfarer wrote:280%??? man you have a steel heart. Some people would have already joined the 12elders in worshipping the Lord. Yaana wange kuwa wameona musa na kondoo tayari
Am laughing at the joke. Not the 280% loss.
how does one make a 280% loss? the highest you can make is 100%. unless ur short selling or using borrowed funds
Its called sarcasm
You can make even 1000% loss. Loss is the opposite of profit..
If you bought at 66 and sold @ 6 you make - 1000% loss
Being (6-66) /6x100 bodmas
Loss sio probability ati it has to add to 1
Hi. I believe you can agree that its the share that has slid 1000% but the shareholder has not wiped out 100% of initial investment
@ obiero, KQ can be a good case study for behavioural finance scientists especially as regards to
• The stock volatility.
Relate KQ price movement to the company fundamentals. In a rational world, prices change only when news arrives. Since Robert Shiller's early work was published in 1981
-economists have realized that aggregate stock prices appear to move much more than can be justified by changes in intrinsic value (as measured by, say, the present value of future dividends). Shiller's work generated long and complex controversy, his conclusion is generally thought to be correct:
Stock and bond prices are more volatile than advocates of rational efficient market theory would predict
• The predictability of the stock price. (Copy, paste)
In an efficient market, future returns cannot be predicted on the basis of existing information. Thirty years ago, financial economists thought this most basic assumption of the efficient market hypothesis was true (Fama 1970).
Now, everyone agrees that stock prices are at least partly predictable (see, for example, Fama 1991) on the basis of past returns, such measures of value as price-to-earnings or price-to-book ratios, company announcements of earnings, dividend changes, and share repurchases and seasoned equity offerings. Although considerable controversy remains about whether the observed predictability is best explained by mispricing or risk, no one has been able to specify an observable, as opposed to theoretical or metaphysical, risk measure that can explain the existing data pattern (see, for example, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1994). Further-more, the charge that these studies are the inevitable result of data mining is belied by the fact that the authors have covered every important corporate announcement that a company can make. Academics have not selectively studied a few obscure situations and published only those results. Rather,
it seems closer to the truth to say that virtually every possible trigger produces apparent excess returns. What should one conclude from these and other empirical facts? On one side of the coin is my own conclusion:
In many important ways, real financial markets do not resemble the ones we would imagine if we only read finance textbooks. On the other side of the coin is the compelling evidence that markets are efficient: the performance of active fund managers. Many studies have documented the underperformance of mutual fund managers and pension fund managers relative to passive investment strategies (see, for example, Malkiel1 995).Furthermore, although there are always some good performers, good performance this year fails to predict good performance the following year, on average (see, for example, Carhart 1997). These cold facts should be kept firmly in mind when evaluating market efficiency. Regardless of the results of academic studies reporting apparently successful trading rules, real-world portfolio managers apparently have no easy time beating the market. This brief discussion of some of the empirical literature should leave the reader with a mixed impression.
Market behavior often diverges from what we would expect in a rational efficient market, but these anomalies do not create such large profit opportunities that active fund managers as a group earn abnormal returns. No inherent contra-diction exists in this combination of facts, although economists have often been confused on this point. A drunk walking through a field can create a random walk, despite the fact that no one would call his choice of direction rational. Still, if asset prices depended on the path the drunk adopted, it would be a good idea to study how drunks navigate.